INTRODUCTION
THE utilitarian principle in ethical theory asserts that the best social policy is the one which gives the greatest total welfare to the individual members of society, where "total welfare" is measured by summing utility numbers for all individuals. This principle has been advocated by philosphers going back to Bentham, and more recently by Harsanyi [5, 6] from the point of view of Bayesian decision theory.
The egalitarian principle in ethical theory asserts that the best social policy is the one which gives the greatest welfare subject to the constraint that all individual members should enjoy equal benefits from society. As long as there is any positive tradeoff between the utility payoffs to different individuals, this egalitarian principle leads to the same social choices as the maximin principle, which always maximizes the utility of the most unfortunate individuals in society. Rawls [12, 13] has argued for the maximin principle in his theory of justice. The egalitarian principle has been studied in a game-theoretic context by Kalai [7] and Myerson [9] .
As Shapley [18] has pointed out, these two ethical principles both use interpersonal comparisons of utility, but in very different ways. Translated into the practical debates of daily life, the utilitarian principle asserts that "you should do something for me if it will hurt you less than it will help me," whereas the egalitarian principle asserts that "you should do something for me if you are better off than I am (or if you have gained more from our cooperation than I have)." This paper will investigate some properties of social choice rules related to these two principles, with the goal of helping to explain why these two principles have been so important both in the development of ethical theories and in practical social decision making. Other approaches to this same question have been studied by Deschamps and Gevers [3, 4] , Sen [17] , D'Aspremont and Gevers [2] , Maskin [8] , and Roberts [14] . Our approach will differ from these others in that we will use the risk properties of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scales in an essential way. In this respect, we will follow Harsanyi [5, 6] , who 883 derives utilitarianism from assumptions about social decision making in the presence of risk.
We will analyze utilitarianism and egalitarianism with respect to a phenomenon which we may call the timing effect in social welfare analysis. To understand this timing effect, consider the following simple example. The -father of twin sons wants to set them up in their careers. His financial resources allow him only two alternatives: he may send both sons to school (for four years each) to become teachers, or he may send one son to school (for eight years) to become a doctor while the other son will have to become a clerk. Each son would prefer to be a doctor over teacher and teacher over clerk; and each son would prefer a .50-.50 gamble between becoming a doctor or a clerk over becoming a teacher for sure. The father is concerned only for the welfare of his two sons, and he wants to be egalitarian. What should he do?
The problem is that the egalitarian principle leads to different conclusions depending on when the welfare of the sons is evaluated. If we think about the sons as they will be in their careers a few years from now, there appears to be only one egalitarian option: both sons must be teachers. On the other hand, if we think about the sons as they are today, then this plan of making both sons teachers is not even Pareto optimal. Both sons would prefer today that the father should plan to send one of them to medical school, letting a fair coin toss decide who gets to become a doctor and who must be a clerk. Before the coin toss, this "randomization" plan seems egalitarian and Pareto dominates the "both teachers" plan; but after the coin toss the randomization plan will seem unegalitarian (since one unfortunate son is a clerk) and the both teachers plan will be ex post Pareto optimal.
The moral of this story is that simply specifying a social welfare function may not be enough to fully determine a procedure for collective decision making. One must also specify when the individuals' preferences or utility levels should be evaluated; before or after the resolution of uncertainties. The timing of social welfare analysis may make a difference.
The timing effect is often an issue in moral debates, as when people argue about whether a social system should be judged with respect to its actual income distribution or with respect to its distribution of economic opportunities. Those who judge with respect to income are implicitly evaluating individuals' welfare at a later point in time than do those who judge with respect to opportunities.
In this paper, we will show that utilitarian and egalitarian choice rules have some special properties with respect to this timing-effect problem. In Section 2, we will develop some basic definitions relating to social choice problems and the choice functions which may be used to solve them. In Section 3, we will see that the timing effect can be ignored if and only if the social choice function is linear, and we will show that linearity and Pareto optimality together imply that a choice function must be of a generalized utilitarian type. This result is closely related to Harsanyi's Theorem V in [5] , with our linearity condition playing the same role as the sure-thing principle in Harsanyi's work.
In Section 4, we will show that, if the linearity condition from Section 3 is replaced by a weaker concavity condition, and if Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives condition [10] is added, then our choice functions must be either utilitarian or egalitarian. This concavity condition has a natural interpretation in terms of the timing effect; it guarantees that the social choices generated by current welfare analysis must ex ante Pareto dominate those choices generated by future welfare analysis. (In our example, we saw that both sons would indeed prefer ex ante the randomization plan, recommended by current egalitarian analysis, over the both teachers plan, recommended by future egalitarian analysis.) That is, concavity guarantees that all individuals should always want social decisions to be planned using current expected utility as the data for welfare analysis, so that the timing effect should never cause disputes over when to evaluate social welfare. Perles and Maschler [11] have also used this concavity property (which they call super-additivity) to characterize a new solution concept for two-person bargaining games.
BASIC DEFINITIONS
In this paper, social choice problems are represented by the sets of feasible utility allocations available to the society. We assume that there are n individuals, numbered 1,2, . .. , n, in the group or society. We also assume that some von Neumann-Morgenstern utility scale (assigning utility values to all imaginable social situations) has been specified for each individual in the society. Thus, any vector x = (xl, . . . , xn) in Rn can be interpreted as a utility allocation vector, corresponding to some social situation or gamble in which each individual i gets expected utility xi, as measured in his given utility scale.
We do not assume here that the given utility scales have any particular significance for interpersonal comparisons. Of course, any increasing affine transformations of the given utility scales would also be valid von NeumannMorgenstern utility scales for the individuals, with identical decision-theoretic properties.
Given any vectors x and y in ER, we write x > y (or y < x) iff xi > yi for every i = 1, 2, . .. , n. Similarly x > y (or y < x) means that xi > yi for every i.
The usual dot product is used for vectors in Rn, that is:
A set S C Rn is comprehensive iff: y < x and x E S together imply that y E S.
That is, a comprehensive set describes a choice situation in which free disposal of any individual's utility is always possible.
A set S C Rn is convex iff: x E S andy E S and 0 < X < 1 together imply that Xx + (1 -X)y E S, where Xx + (1 -X)y is the vector whose ith component is Xxi + (1 -X)yi. Since we are measuring utilities in von Neumann-Morgenstern scales, if the group can always plan to randomize between any two collective choice options, then the set of feasible expected utility allocations will be convex. In this paper, a choice problem is formally defined to be a nonempty, closed, convex, and comprehensive subset of R', representing the set of feasible utility allocations. That is, we shall always assume that randomized strategies and free disposal of utility are possible in every choice problem.
Throughout, we let CP denote the set of choice problems to be studied. Also, we define CP' to be the class of all choice problems which can be generated as the comprehensive convex hulls of nonempty finite sets of allocations. That is: CPO = (fH(x', . . ., Xk)I (XI, . . . , Xk'} is a finite subset of Rn}.
All the results which we derive will hold for the case of CP = CPO, but we may allow CP to represent more general classes of convex comprehensive sets as well.
For any two sets S C llR and T C R' and any number A, we define AS + (1 -A)T to be the set: XS + ( -)T = {Ax + (1 -A)ylx e S andy e T}.
If 0 < X < 1, then we can interpret this set as follows. Suppose there is some random variable which may take the value 0, with probability A, or may take the value 1, with probability 1 -A. Suppose further that the individuals know that they will learn the random variable's true value tomorrow; if the value is 0 then the group will get a choice problem with feasible set S, and if the value is 1 then the feasible set will be T. Now suppose the group decides to plan its choices today, before learning the random variable. Then XS + (1 -X) T is the set of expected utility allocations which can be generated by making such conditional plans today.
Given any collection of choice problems CP, we define a choice function to be a mapping F: CP -E Rn such that, for every S in CP:
F(S) = (F1(S), . . ., Fn(S)) E S.
That is, a choice function should select a feasible utility allocation vector for every choice problem. In the rest of this paper, we will study various properties which we might want a choice function to satisfy, and we will characterize the classes of choice functions which can satisfy these properties.
LINEAR AND UTILITARIAN CHOICE FUNCTIONS
In this section, we consider choice functions satisfying weak Pareto optimality and linearity properties. The linearity property has a natural interpretation in terms of timing of social choices. Suppose that a social decision will have to be made tomorrow, at which time the set of feasible utility allocations either will be S, with probability X, or will be T, with probability 1 -X. If F will be applied to the choice problem tomorrow, then the chosen utility allocation will either be F(S), with probability X, or F(T), with probability (1 -A). So the expected utility allocation (as assessed today) is AF(S) + (1 -X)F(T), if the social choices are to be made tomorrow. On the other hand, XS + (1 -A) T is the set of all expected utility allocations which are now feasible by planning tomorrow's decisions today (using contingency plans which may depend on the information to be learned tomorrow). If F is applied to the choice problem on the planning level today, then F(XS + (1 -X)T) should be the chosen utility allocation. Thus, a linear choice function is one for which every individual can expect the same utility from a social choice whether it is planned ahead today or made on a situational basis tomorrow.
We say that a function F: CP -* R' is utilitarian iff there exists some vector P = (pl,... so this inequality implies p E Q(S), a contradiction of the way p was constructed. To avoid this contradiction, we must conclude that F is utilitarian.
Q.E.D.
CONCAVE AND EGALITARIAN CHOICE FUNCTIONS
Let E: CP -* Rn be the choice function which always selects the highest feasible allocation giving all individuals equal utility. That is, E is weakly Pareto optimal and satisfies: EI(S) = E2(S) = * = En(S) for every choice problem S. Since all our choice problems are closed comprehensive sets, there will always be a unique point on the weakly Pareto optimal frontier which satisfies this equity condition, so E is well-defined.
The choice function E is consistent with the maximin principle recommended by Rawls As before, one might argue that we should call these "rescaled egalitarian" choice functions, reserving the term "properly egalitarian" for the choice function E above. However, any choice function which is egalitarian in our above sense could also be represented as properly egalitarian if we used the appropriate affine transformations of the individuals' utility scales (mapping xi to (xi -ui)/ci). That is, our egalitarian choice functions are precisely those which could be represented as properly egalitarian under some selection of von Neumann-Morgenstem utility scales for the individuals.
An egalitarian choice function like E is generally neither linear nor utilitarian. For example, (letting n = 2) suppose that S = H ((4, 4), (0, 10) ) and T = H ((4,4),(10,0) ). H((4, 4), (7,2), (2,7), (5,5) ). So we get:
Then E(S) = (4,4) and E(T) = (4,4). But L S + -T=

E( S + T) = (5,5) #-(4' 4) E(S) + } E(T).
Although egalitarian choice functions do not satisfy linearity, they do satisfy a weaker property. A choice function F: CP -* R' is concave iff:
F(AS + (1 -X)T) > XF(S) + (1 -X)F(T)
for every pair of choice problems S and T in CP, and for every number X such that 0 < X < 1 and XS + (1 -)T E CP. (Notice that the formula above is a vector inequality in Rl, meaning that the inequality holds in every component.)
In the last section we saw that a linear choice function is one for which every individual can expect the same utility from a social choice whether it is planned ahead "today" or made on a situational basis "tomorrow." In these terms, a concave choice function is one for which every individual's expected utility from planning ahead (F1(XS + (1 -X) T)) is always greater than or equal to his expected utility from situational judgments (XFi(S) + (1 -X)Fi(T)). So, when a concave choice function is used, the timing of social choices can make a difference; but timing would never be a cause for dispute, because all individuals would agree that earlier (planned-ahead) choices yield better expected outcomes.
For illustration, let us return to the numerical example given above, with S = H((4,4), (0, 10)) and T = H ((4,4), (10,0) ). Suppose that a fair coin is about to be tossed: if it comes up heads then the two individuals will be offered the choice problem S, and if it comes up tails, then they will be offered the choice problem T. Applying the choice function E after the coin toss will yield the equitable (and ex post Pareto optimal) allocation (4,4), no matter how the coin may fall. But if the individuals plan their group choice before the coin is tossed, then the choice function E selects the equitable (and ex ante Pareto optimal) allocation (5, 5), which is implemented by planning to take (0, 10) if heads and (10,0) if tails. Thus, we have the concavity relation:
E( 2 S + 2 T) = (55) > (4 4) = 2 E(S) + 1 E(T)
So before the coin is tossed, there is no dispute about whether to plan the group choices immediately or to wait until after the coin is tossed; both want to plan the group choices immediately.
Of course any linear utilitarian choice function must also be concave, since linearity implies concavity trivially. Furthermore, any egalitarian choice function must be concave. To prove this fact, suppose that: Recall that CPF is the set of all choice problems which can be generated as comprehensive convex hulls of finite sets of points in R . If we impose the regularity condition that CP D CPO, then we can state our second main result, characterizing utilitarianism and egalitarianism. ASSUMPTION: In Lemmas 9 through 12 we will assume that F is not utilitarian. We will prove that F must be egalitarian. Since Lemma 12, stating that F is egalitarian, was proven under the assumption that F is not utilitarian, we have proven the Theorem.
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